

Practical Standpoint and Its Legitimacy: On Korsgaard's Justification of Personal Identity

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Abstract

In order to justify the existence of personal identity, Korsgaard puts forward the thesis of practical standpoint. It is composed mainly of three parts: (1) the dichotomy between theoretical and practical facts, (2) the active capacity for change, and (3) self-constitution in the sense of practical identity. This article focuses on the first two parts of practical standpoint, examining its lurking problems while making necessary modifications to, or enrichments of, it. First, the dichotomy between theoretical and practical facts is replaced with that of IP (impression and perception) and SP (self-consciousness and practice) approaches. By elaborating upon the first element of practical standpoint argument, that is, the self-validation inherent in our self-consciousness, the justificatory power of practical standpoint is thereby bolstered. Next, given that mental activities like reflective deliberation can be reduced into a certain content of consciousness and explicated by Frankfurt's Reductionism, the creative dimension of moral agency, as the second constituent of practical standpoint argument, is introduced to solidify the active nature of moral agency.

Keywords: personal identity, IP approach, SP approach, moral agency, practical standpoint, self-validation