

罗素和金岳霖论事实

——从比较哲学的视角看

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摘 要：本文对罗素和金岳霖的事实观做了系统的梳理和比较。罗素发展了一种实在主义事实观，其核心论题是：世界包含事实，事实在外部世界中。他通过逻辑分析的原子，如各种“殊相”、谓词和关系，得到原子事实，由众多的原子事实通过逻辑联结词和量词的连接，得到复合事实、普遍事实和存在事实，由此来说明世界的本体论结构。他把自己的这套学说叫做“逻辑原子主义”。金岳霖或许受到罗素及其哲学的影响，对有关事实的诸多问题做了系统的探讨。他发展了一种认知主义事实观，其核心论题是：事实是被接受和安排了的所与，更明确地说，事实是认知主体在感觉材料基础上所做的一种认知建构，兼具客观性和主观性。这种事实观与罗素的事实观迥然有别，得出了很多与后者截然相反的结论。金岳霖不只是罗素哲学的追随者和复述者，他基于深广的中西哲学传统，做独立思考，提出了带有原创性的哲学学说，是现代中国一位很少见的原创型哲学家。

关键词：罗素，金岳霖，事实，实在主义事实观，认知主义事实观

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Russell and Jin Yuelin on Facts

From the Perspective of Comparative Philosophy

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Abstract: This article systematically reviews and compares Russell's and JIN Yuelin's views on facts. Russell develops a realist conception of fact. His core thesis is that the world contains facts, and that facts are located in the external world. Through logical analysis, Russell arrives at "logical atoms," including particulars, predicates and relations. Combination of Logical atoms gives rise to atomic facts. Through logical constants, atomic facts are connected into molecular facts, universal facts, and existential facts. Russell appeals to the logical structure of language to explain the ontological structure of the world.

Influenced by Russell and his philosophy, JIN Yuelin develops a cognitivist conception of facts. His core thesis is that facts are the given, accepted and arranged by us, and more specifically, facts are cognitive constructions we build on the basis of sensory material. Facts are both objective and subjective. JIN's conception of facts is very different from Russell's, and its conclusions are in conflict with the latter. JIN Yuelin is thus not only a follower of Russell's philosophy. Based on the traditions of both Chinese and Western philosophies, JIN is an original philosopher, being rare in modern China, who developed a new theory of facts.

Key words: fact, Russell, realist conception of fact, JIN Yuelin, cognitivist conception of facts